Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses by Klein, William A
Boston College Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 5 Special Issue The Revenue Act of 1971 Article 9
5-1-1973
Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses
William A. Klein
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William A. Klein, Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses, 14 B.C.L. Rev. 917 (1973),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol14/iss5/9
TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR FAMILY CARE EXPENSES
WILLIAM A. KLEIN*
In 1954 Congress introduced into the income tax laws a pro-
vision allowing, in certain circumstances, a limited deduction of ex-
penses for care of dependents incurred by working people. In 1971
Congress made sweeping changes in that provision, greatly expanding
the deductions that may be claimed for caring for dependents and
allowing for the first time a deduction for household expenses not
related to such care. The details of both the present and the earlier
provisions and of their legislative history have been amply researched
and described in recently published papers.' Consequently, the present
article offers only a review of the highlights of the current law and its
ancestors, and focuses instead on the questions of its economic effects
and implicit or explicit sociological assumptions. The article will
discuss the effect of the 1971 amendments on the taxpayer's decisions
to work and to have children, the interrelationship between these two
decisions, and the potential impact of the new law on the creation
of new jobs in child care and domestic service. Finally, the question
of the fairness of allowing a child care deduction will be examined.
I. PAST AND CURRENT LAW
Nonstatutory Doctrine
Prior to 1954 the only Code section under which a deduction for
dependent-care expenses might plausibly have been allowed was the
general provision, the predecessor of section 162, allowing a deduction
for the "ordinary and necessary expenses [of] carrying on any trade
or business."2 The leading case denying the deduction under that
* A.B., Harvard University, 1952; LL.B., Harvard University Law School, 1957;
Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1 Feld, Deductibility of Expenses for Child Care and Household Services: New
Section 214, 27 Tax L. Rev. 415 (1972); Hjortl, A Tax Subsidy for Child Care: Sec.
210 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1971, 50 Taxes 133 (1972); Keane, Federal Income
Taxation of Child Care Expenses, 10 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (1972) (this article came to
the author's attention after submission of this manuscript and therefore no further
reference is made to it); Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of In-
come Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 49 (1971); Comment,
The Child Care Deduction: Issues Raised by Michael and Elizabeth Nammack and the
Pending Amendment to Section 214, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 270 (1971); Note, 41
U. Cin. L. Rev. 264 (1972); Note, Sex and the Single Man: Discrimination in the
Dependent Care Deduction, 5 Valparaiso L. Rev. 415 (1971).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a) (1). In one case, in a rather unique set of cir-
cumstances, a deduction for child care expenses was claimed as a medical expense under
the predecessor of § 213, on the theory that the taxpayer's health was imperiled by the
necessity of caring for the children. The deduction was denied. Ochs v. Commissioner,
195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952).
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language was Henry C. Smith.3 While the opinion is not enlightening,
it is sufficiently provocative to warrant careful examination. The facts
are simply stated. Mr. and Mrs. Smith were both employed and filed
a joint return' in which they claimed a deduction for the expense of
hiring someone to care for their young child. According to the opinion
of the Board of Tax Appeals, the Smiths' argument was simply that "but
for" the fact that Mrs. Smith was working the child care expense need
not have been incurred.' Since there was no suggestion that the Smiths
would have hired a caretaker for the child even if one of them had
been unemployed, the "but for" argument seemed to have considerable
force, and the Board's rebuttal to this argument missed the point.
Adopting a reductia ad absurdum approach, the Board stated that if
the Smiths' argument were accepted, then a deduction for food and
shelter should also be allowed as a business expense since without food
and shelter a person would be physically unable to work. The obvious
irrelevance of that observation lies in the fact that the cost of food and
shelter is unavoidable for nonworkers as well as workers, whereas
child care expenses are unavoidable only for workers.'
The Board's attack on the "but for" argument would have been
more persuasive if it had been launched from another angle. The Board
neglected the fact that child care expenses are not incurred by all
workers, but only by those who have children. The expense, therefore,
is attributable not only to the decision to work—taking children as
given—but also to the decision to have children—taking work as
given. In other words, the expense at issue can be looked upon in part
as a cost of working and in part as a cost of having children—that is,
as a trade or business expense and a personal expense—but not as
either one alone. Such an observation scarcely resolves the question of
deductibility, but at least it avoids spurious causative analysis' and
brings into sharper focus the central issue of the case.
Passing from its discussion of the "but for" or causative argu-
ment, the Board referred to the notion of the wife (not, it may be
noted, the husband) as a provider of "services as custodian of the
40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
4 The case arose before the era of split income, but even then married couples were
permitted to file a Joint return and In certain circumstances could gain a modest ad-
vantage by doing so. See B. Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income, Estate, and Gift
Taxation 348 (4th ed. 1972).
5 It was no doubt a sign of the times that the possibility was not even considered
that Mr. Smith, rather than Mrs. Smith, could have been the child's caretaker.
0 The Board might have found in the denial of deductions for commuting expenses
a more useful example for rebuttal. Cf. Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Ex-
penses: Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54
Cornell L. Rev. 871 (1969).
7
 Cf. id. at 876-71, 890-92.
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home and protector of its children," 8 and pointed out that ordinarily
these services are provided without financial reward. To use the jargon
of the present-day economist, the nonworking spouse, husband or wife,
provides imputed income in the form of services to the household or
family. What is curious about the Board's observation is that it may
be used to support rather than undercut the allowance of a deduction
for child care expense.° Because the cash income of the working wife
is taxed while the imputed income of the nonworking wife is not, a
deduction for child care can be defended as a means of mitigating the
inequality in tax results. This argument seems to have escaped the
Board.°
Finally, the Board reached what was probably the soundest basis
for its holding: the observation that the expenses incurred for child
care were simply not "ordinary" business expenses. This observation
is accurate because of two characteristics of child care expenses: first,
they do not belong to a class of expenses that are incurred by all busi-
ness people and, second, that class of expenses that includes child care
is defined by a nonbusiness phenomenon. Thus, even if one were pre-
pared to concede that child care expenses should, in certain circum-
stances," be deductible by working people, one might deny that such
expenses are within the class of "ordinary and necessary expenses .. .
incurred . . . in carrying on a trade or business" 12 as contemplated
by Congress when it adopted that language. This latter view gains
force from the fact that the deduction had never been allowed under
the provision for deduction of business and trade expenses relied on
by the Smiths—a provision that had been in effect over a period of
more than twenty-five years."
The 1954 Act
In 1954 Congress responded to the claims of people like the
Smiths with a new deduction provision," but the response was meager
and somewhat chaotic. Instead of developing a rational, coherent set
8 40 B.T.A. at 1039.
9 See discussion in text at notes 107-09 infra.
10 It is true that the working spouse may well earn a large amount of imputed
income by doing the housework in the evening and on weekends, as may the single
working person without dependents, but that would result in a reduction in their imputed
income from leisure.
11 Such situations may include instances where the wife's work is absolutely necessary
to support the family.
12 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a). The language of this section was taken from
§ 23(a)(1)(B) of the 1939 Code. -
19 See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(1)(B).
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214 (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch.
736, § 214, 68A Stat. 70) [hereinafter references to this provision as it stood in 1954
will be cited as 1954 Code].
919
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
of rules based on sound principles of taxation consistently applied,
Congress seems to have proceeded by a process of accretion from
intuitive reactions to concrete situations, and by that process of accre-
tion covered both too much and too little—mostly too little.
The paradigm from which the original version of the statute
seems to have been developed was that of the impoverished young
widow, forced by her pitiable state to work in order to support herself
and her infant child. 15
 It is by no means difficult to argue in favor of
giving such a person a deduction for child care expenses on grounds
of simple compassion or as a means of reducing the welfare budget.
But the strongest argument from a tax policy standpoint was that
relied upon in one statement in the House Report that compared the
expenses of the widow who was forced to work with business ex-
penses: 10
 the rationale implicit in the statement is that in such a case
child care is properly regarded as more significantly related to the
decision to work than to the earlier decision to have children. Here,
however, a caveat is in order. An examination of the legislative history
in conjunction with the terms of the provision suggests that this argu-
ment may have been a rationalization for a decision reached on non-
rational grounds. 17 The congressional starting point appears to have
been the concrete need of the widowed mother, and its reaction was
15 See House Comm. on Ways and Means, ht. Rev. Code of 1954, H.R. Rep. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954):
Your Committee has added this deduction to the code because it recognizes that
a widow or a widower with young children must incur these expenses in order
to earn a livelihood and that they, therefore, are comparable to an employee's
business expenses.
16
 Id. See also Senate Comm. on Finance, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S. Rep. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954). The statement by the House was not accompanied by any
discussion or explanation of the business nature of the expense. The Senate Report
utilized the same statement but also left it standing without any tax analysis.
17
 As mentioned in note 16 supra, the statement comparing child care expenses to
business expenses was not followed by any tax analysis regarding distinctions between
business and personal expenses. This fact should be viewed in conjunction with the
remarks of congressmen, none of whose arguments utilized tax analysis. Rather, they
seemed motivated by the desire to provide for the widowed mother and others whose
plight appeared similar. See I00 Cong. Rec. 3451 (1954) (remarks of Rep. Forand),
and Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 1d Sess.
1057 (1954).
Moreover, an analysis of the legislative intention must consider what provisions
Congress actually enacted: the statute as enacted in 1954 limited the deduction in terms
of who could claim it and the amount that could be claimed. In addition, the Senate
Committee explicitly rejected the Kerr-Smith Amendment, a proposal that would have
extended the deduction to men. See id. at 1798. Such treatment is inconsistent with normal
business expense deduction theory. Finally, the legislative history of subsequent amend-
ments to the child care provision substantiates the conclusion that Congress viewed
the deduction as a relief measure for certain needy individuals and not as analogues
to a business expense. See, e.g., Senate Comm. on Finance, Revenue Act of 1964, S.
Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1741 (1964).
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to provide relief for that particular need, whose appeal no constituency
could deny, rather than to assess that need systematically as a part of
a larger problem of tax policy. Had Congress followed the latter route,
it might have been forced to analyze the expense in terms of its busi-
ness and/or personal nature and to have constructed the deduction,
or denied it, as an across-the-board provision applicable to all tax-
payers who incurred comparable expenses. No such analysis is apparent
in the legislative history referred to above.
The illogical quirks that are revealed in the ensuing discussion,
quirks that characterized the deduction from its inception, are best
understood as manifestations of the proposition that it was originally
conceived more in the heart than the head. At the same time one cannot
reject the notion--implicit in the idea of conditioning the deduction on
a decision to work" and explicit in the one statement referred to above"
—that the deduction was regarded as related to the production of
income. Starting from the second of these propositions, it is not sur-
prising that Congress granted the deduction to all widowed and divorced
women; the appeal to compassion in such cases seems plain. But the
absence of careful analysis is revealed in the failure to impose limits.
The language of the statute made the deduction available not only to
the impoverished widow but also to a working widow of immense
wealth, 2° who might well have had abundant household help whether or
not she worked, or to a woman with very high earnings, for whom child
care and other household help might equally be thought of as a normal
consumption item rather than a business expense. The congressional
expansiveness in allowing the deduction in such cases is particularly
noteworthy and significant in light of the income limit imposed on
married couples"—in light of the fact, that is, that Congress knew
perfectly well how to take the deduction away as income rose, and
that there is no apparent reason why this rule could not have been
made applicable to single women.
Given the decision to allow a deduction for widows with children,
1° 1954 Code * 214(a).
1° See note 15 supra.
20 The statute contains a requirement that the expense must be incurred "for the
purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully employed." 1954 Code 214(a).
Arguably the deduction could be denied under this language to a person with an indepen-
dent income, or even to anyone whose earned income is so high that nursemaids would
have been hired without regard to the inability of the earner to provide caretaker
services. But the Treasury appears to have taken that position only in extreme situations,
such as where the widow's job is part-time at a low salary and the child has been
attending boarding school for several years before the job was taken. See Treas. Reg.
§I 1.214-1(f)(4) and (0(5), Ex. 4 (1956). A similar argument can be made for denying
the deduction for all household expenses under the 1971 amendments; see text at notes
65-68 infra.
21 See text at note 38 infra.
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it is easy enough to understand why Congress accepted a series of
extensions of the basic principle implicitly adopted in arriving at that
decision. Thus it is easy to see why the deduction was given to all
unmarried women with children," as well as to widowers and divorced
(or legally separated) men." A further extension of the paradigm case
permitted the deduction of expenses for caring for certain dependents
other than children—those who were incapable of caring for them-
selves.24 Again, this is an extension that can easily be accepted without
the necessity of defining precisely the principle being applied. But
how can we explain Congress' refusal of the deduction to never-
married men with incapacitated dependents?" Surely, if a widower
could deduct the cost of caring for his invalid dependent mother, as
plainly he could, a never-married man should be entitled to the same
deduction. Indeed, a statute drawing a distinction between the two
cases might seem so capricious as to violate the Constitution's require-
ment of due process in its application to the never-married man," and
in a recent court of appeals decision the statutory provision that had
precluded the never-married man from taking the dependent care
deduction was in fact held unconstitutional."
The plight of the never-married man, however, can readily be
attributed simply to hurried draftsmanship or, more probably, to the
kind of legislative myopia associated with statutes springing from
concrete cases rather than general principles, and, in any event, the
problem can be dismissed as relatively insignificant. The same cannot
be said, however, of the provision limiting the deduction to $600 a
year." Surely, even in 1954, Congress could not have believed that
widows and others who were forced to work to support themselves
and their families, including small children, could hire baby sitters
22 This particular extension was the handiwork of the Senate Finance Committee,
which exhibited a commendable display of forebearance from using the tax laws to
punish unwed mothers for their antisocial (at least by the mores of 1954) conduct.
See S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 16, at 36. Never-married men with illegitimate children
in their care were not gathered in under the same protective umbrella. 1954 Code
§§ 214(a), (c) (2).
28 This last result was accomplished by use of the Alice-in-Wonderland device of
defining the term "widower" to include men who were divorced or legally separated.
1954 Code § 214(c) (2).
24 1954 Code § 214(c) (1) (B), another extension of coverage added by the Senate
Finance Committee. See S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 16, at 36.
25 See note 22 supra.
26 We are so inured to the pervasiveness of injustice in the Code that most ex-
perienced tax people would quickly dismiss such an argument.
27 Moritz v. Commissioner, CCII 1972 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9759,
at 85,908 (10th Cir., Nov. 22, 1972), rev'g Charles E. Moritz, 55 T.C. 113 (1970). See
discussion in Note, 5 Valparaiso L. Rev., supra note 1. Cf. note 32 infra.
28 1954 Code 214(b) (I) (A).
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for -$12 a week." If one accepts the principle that for such tax-
payers caretaker expenses were properly regarded as business ex-
penses," the allowance of a deduction lower than the full amount
reasonably required cannot be justified. For a person such as the
wealthy widow, who might well have nursemaids around the clock
even if she were unemployed, it can be argued that there should
be no deduction at all since the expense is not related to the job."
But that reasoning cannot support a dollar limitation on the deduc-
tion for all taxpayers." All that it would justify is a phase-out of the
deduction as income rises, a technique that was in fact applied to
married couples" and thus was one with which Congress was at the
time quite familiar. Hence the imposition of the dollar limitation even
on those for whom the costs could arguably be called business expenses
—those who could not choose not to work—would appear inexplicable,
save as an arbitrary revenue-saving device. It has been suggested, in
fact, that the smallness of the deduction allowed—together with other
restrictions that are wholly illogical if one assumes that Congress in-
tended to grant a quasi-business deduction—supports the theory that
in 1954 the legislature envisioned the deduction primarily as a relief
measure.84
 Even so, to the extent that the 1954 Congress did, rightly
or wrongly, regard the deduction as analogous to a business expense,
the dollar limitation is irrational.
To the same extent, the 1954 provisions were irrational in treating
the expense an an itemized deduction—one that must be sacrificed if
the standard deduction is claimed. As a practical matter this treat-
ment meant that the value of the deduction was substantially reduced,
or more probably eliminated, for low-income people." Although it can
be argued that the deduction should not be viewed as a form of poverty
28 This is not to suggest that such a bargain rate would never be possible, only
that it would be quite uncommon, at least if the care of an infant were involved.
80 See note 15 supra.
81 See Pechman, Individual Income Tax Provisions of the 1954 Code, 8 Nat'l Tax J.
114, 121 (1955), defending the $600 limit by reference to this kind of situation.
82 In Michael P. Nammack, 56 T.C. 1379, 1385 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 459 F.2d
1045 (2d Cir. 1972), it was argued, unsuccessfully, that the dollar limitation was so
arbitrary as to be unconstitutional.
It has also been argued by the Treasury that the limitation could be Justified as a
method of protecting the revenue. See Note, 5 Valparaiso L. Rev., supra note I, at 423.
By the same token, however, it could be argued that all business expense deductions,
should be limited to, say, 90% of the actual outlay, in order to produce revenue. Even
if one accepted such a generalized approach, however, it would be absurd to limit it to
arbitrarily selected categories of business expenses.
88 See text at note 38 infra.
84 Sec Comment, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev., supra note 1, at 277-78, 280-82.
88 Persons with low incomes usually do not have suffident deductions to make
itemization worthwhile and generally claim the standard deduction, which provides them
with a greater after-tax benefit.
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relief," it may still be true that of the expenses poor people incur,
child care expenses are most clearly equivalent to, or at least closely
analogous to, business expenses. Thus, once the decision is made to
justify the deductions as business related, refusal to treat them like
other business expenses, as adjustments to gross income" rather than
as itemized personal deductions, seems tantamout to taxing a poor
working person on more than his or her true net income.
The rules relating to married couples seem even more curious
than those that have already been outlined. The overriding rule was
that the maximum $600 deduction was phased out, dollar for dollar,
as income rose above $4,500, so that for couples with a joint income
above $5,100 there would be no deduction at all." The rationale for
this limitation, though unstated in the legislative history, seems self-
evident—a married woman's place was in the home, unless she was
forced to work in order to keep the family above a very minimal
economic level of existence." If we assume again that the cost of
child care is to be regarded as a business expense, then it is accurate
to say that denial of the deduction will tend to promote a policy of
inducing those married women who might want to work to stay home
and take care of their children instead. Therefore the phase-out of the
deduction was not neutral in its impact of the issue of whether a woman
should or should not work. The implication of the statute was clear,
that women with husbands should not be encouraged to go to work
and hire others to take care of their children unless the family was
poor." In light of this implication it does not seem strange that in
the middle and late 1960's, when women finally rebelled at being
deprived of free choice as to the role they would occupy, the statute
came under attack.'
The policies and reasoning underlying other aspects of the statute
are equally perplexing. For example, if a woman's husband were in-
capable of supporting the family because of physical or mental dis-
ability, then presumably the woman could no longer afford to stay
86 See Blumberg, supra note 1, at 78.
87 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 62.
as 1954 Code § 214(3)(2)(B).
89 See Blumberg, supra note 1, at 71; Note, 5 Valparaiso L. Rev., supra note I,
at 429. The rationale suggested in the text does not explain the generosity extended
toward widows with large independent incomes. See note 18 supra. One wonders what
the Moritz court (see note 25 supra) would do about this quirk in the statute. Would
it or could it deny the deduction to such widows? Or would it extend the deduction to
everyone, regardless of income? Or would it strike down the entire provision?
40 In Michael P. Nammack, 56 T.C. 1379 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 459 F.2d 1045
(2d Cir. 1972), a constitutional attack on this treatment of non-poor married women
was rejected.
41 Id.
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at home," and the rationale for denying the deduction would not
ordinarily apply." In such cases, therefore, the statute in effect treated
the husband as a nonperson and allowed the deduction without regard
to the family income. On the other hand, if it were the woman who
was physically disabled to the point where she was incapable of per-
forming her role as caretaker of the children, the family's child care
deduction was nevertheless subjected to the income phase-out. It seems
illogical to treat the husband in this situation any differently from the
wife, a widower or a divorced man. The fact is, again inexplicably,
that he was treated differently.
These, then, were the basic guidelines for a provision with some
rather inexplicable twists and turns: single women, formerly married
men, and couples with low incomes could claim a deduction up to
$600 per year for the care of certain dependents; others could deduct
nothing.
The 1963 and 1964 Amendments.
In 1963 the House Ways and Means Committee offered a set
of modest changes designed to broaden somewhat the scope of the
dependent care deduction while retaining its basic structure and ap-
proach." For some reason, only one change passed the Senate Finance
Committee" and became law." This change extended the deduction
to women whose husbands had deserted them; previously, only formally
divorced women qualified. Deserted husbands were ignored.
In 1964 the Ways and Means Committee renewed its recom-
mendations of 1963 4T and, with some modification, these were accepted
by the Senate Committee" and enacted." The income level at which
42 The statute, another example of inept draftsmanship, did not take into account
the possibility that the husband, though incapable of working, might continue to enjoy
a substantial income.
43 It seems to have been assumed that a man incapable of supporting his family
was also incapable of caring for the children. Perhaps the assumption was that even if a
man incapable of working could nonetheless care for his children, he could not be ex-
pected as a matter of course to make himself available for that role.
It is also possible here that the expense in this situation is not business related at
all, that is, the husband would have worked whether or not the wife was disabled but
the wife would not work unless the husband were disabled. Thus, in the wife's case,
the child care expense is more directly related to her returning to work.
44 See House Comm. on Ways and Means, Revenue Act of 1963, H.R. Rep. No. 749,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1963).
45 Senate Comm. on Finance, Income Tax Deduction for Child-Care Expenses in
Case of Woman Deserted by Husband, S. Rep. No. 69, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
48 Pub. L. No. 88-4, 77 Stat. 4 (1963).
47 H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
48 Senate Comm. on Finance, Revenue Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 68-70 (1964). The most significant modification was an increase in the income
level at which the deduction phase-out began. See also Conf. Rep. No. 1149, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 29 (1964).
49
 Pub. L. No. 88-272, tit. II, § 212(a), 78 Stat. 49 (1964).
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the phase-out of the deduction began was raised from $4,500 to
$6,000," in order "to carry out the original intention of Congress with
respect to this provision," and the intention to cover "the average
case where the wife has found it necessary to supplement the husband's
income by working."51
 The maximum age of a child for whose care
a deduction could be claimed, without regard to disability, was raised
from eleven to twelve." The deduction was made available to a married
man whose wife was incapacitated or institutionalized."
One modification achieved by the 1964 amendments merits some
comment. The maximum deduction was raised, for families with two
or more dependents, from $600 (which continued to be the maximum
for one dependent) to $900." This change certainly made some sense,
on the very reasonable assumption that it will often cost more to
care for two dependents than one and that the law should take account
of this reality. As the Report of the Ways and Means Committee
stated, the flat $600 limitation "fails to take into account the fact
that costs of caring for dependents, particularly where they must be
cared for outside the home, increases as the number of dependents
increases."' But that statement raises the question, why stop with
two? If two cost more than one, and if the intended policy behind
the statute was to account for this increased cost by increasing the
maximum deduction, why not provide further increases in the deduc-
tion as the number of dependents is further increased?" I raise this
question partly to justify offering the following speculation about
congressional concepts of the family and of childbearing habits and
attitudes: the unexpressed and perhaps subconscious rationale behind
limiting the increase in the deduction to two children could have been
50 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214, as amended, Act of Feb. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-272, tit. II, § 212(a), 78 Stat. 49 (codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, I 214 (b) (2) (B)
(1964) [hereinafter references to this provision as it stood in 1964 will be cited as 1964
Code]. This change was initiated in the Senate. See text at note 48 supra.
al S. Rep. No. 830, supra note 48, at 68 (emphasis added).
52 1964 Code § 214(d) (1) (A).
53
 1964 Code § 214(a). In such cases the deduction was subject to the income-
related phase-out if the wife was merely incapacitated, but not if she was "institution-
alized . for a period of at least 90 consecutive days ... or a shorter period if terminated
by her death." 1964 Code § 214(b)(2) (B). See also 1964 Code § 214(c), (d) (4). Pre-
sumably the idea behind this rule was that people with incomes above $6,000 per year
might hire baby sitters for personal reasons and might try to feign incapacity and that
it would be difficult to deal with the factual issue presented in such cases. The idea
seems a bit paranoid (as tax rules often are) but certainly is not wholly irrational,
although it leaves room for quibbling over the level of income selected as the arbitrary
cutoff point.
64
 1964 Code § 214(b)(1)(B).
55
 H.R. Rep. No. 749, supra note 44, at 57.
as The Senate Finance Committee in fact suggested a further increase to $1,000 for
three or more dependents. S. Rep. No. 830, supra note 48, at 69.
926
DEDUCTIONS FOR FAMILY CARE EXPENSES
that it was perfectly "normal"—indeed, almost nonvolitional—to have
two children, but beyond that point having children was a purely
"personal," volitional decision for which one ought to be prepared
to bear the full costs, including the costs of baby sitters in the event
that a later decision to work made it necessary to incur such costs."
In other words, the law may reflect the idea that a married person
has little choice but to have at least one or two children, and that
consequently the cost of child care, in the event that both parents
work, cannot be regarded as a product of a personal decision to have
children. In such cases, then, the child care cost can properly be
regarded as a product of the decision to work and should be deductible
as analogous to a business expense. The statute may then be thought
to reflect the further idea that when people decide to have more than
two children they are making a personal decision to have children
and that therefore the child care expense is a product of the decision
to have children and should not be deductible. In this situation, the
married person is off on a lark of his or her own and must be prepared
to pay the full costs of his or her deviant behavior.
The .1971 Act
In 1971 Congress set out to expand substantially the scope of
the dependent care deduction. Although the draftsmen retained some
remnants of its predecessor, they changed the basic format and ap-
proach of the provision and added a deduction for the expenses of
caring for the household as well as for people"—that is, under certain
" 
See generally Klein, supra note 6, developing an analogous notion of variable
and nonvariable necessary conditions to incurring commuting expenses.
58 Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, amending Act of Aug. 16,
1954, ch. 736, § 214, 68A Stat. 70 (codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(a) (1972)).
[Hereinafter references to this provision as it stood following the 1971 amendments will
be cited as Int. Rev. Code of 1954.]
At the same time that Congress passed the 1971 amendments, it had under considera-
tion a welfare reform bill that contained provisions relying heavily on providing poor
people with subsidized child care. See House Comm. on Ways and Means, Social Security
Amendments of 1971, H.R. Rep. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 166-68 (1971). See
also Senate Finance Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Summary of the Principal Provisions
of H.R. 1 as Determined by the Committee on Finance 91-92 (Comm. Print, June 13,
1972). The Ways and Means Committee Report on that bill also suggested that amend-
ments to 214 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would help poor people. H.R. Rep.
No. 92-231, supra at 6. That suggestion seems unjustified in light of the fact that poor
people pay little if any income tax and are taxed at Iow marginal rates so that a deduc-
tion is not nearly so significant to them as it is to the non-poor. Moreover, both before
and after 1971, the deduction under 1 214 was an itemized deduction and thus was of
little or no use to most poor people.
Already there have been efforts to expand § 214 beyond its present scope. See "Senate
Widens Tax Deductions in Child Care," Los Angeles Times, Oct. 6, 1972, at 11, col. 8;
"Bigger Tax Break for Working Parents Killed," Los Angeles Times, Oct. 16, 1972, at 21,
col. 1.
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conditions at least part of the wages of cleaning people and cooks
can now be deducted by those eligible to take the deduction for
dependent care.
The old approach of dealing separately with widows, widowers
and divorced people on the one hand, and married couples on the
other, was for the most part abandoned." Instead, the basic require-
ment for eligibility for the deduction is simply that the taxpayer have
a "qualifying individual"—that is, a dependent who by statutory
definition needs care—in his or her household." Insofar as it relates
to the dependent care expenses of married couples this requirement
seems sensible and innocuous"—without a dependent there will be
no expenses for care. However, it does seem to produce some trouble-
some results in case of divorce." To be a "qualifying individual" a
child must be a dependent of the taxpayer claiming the deduction.
If the noncustodial parent makes child support payments, the child
may turn out not to be the custodial parent's dependent." Thus it
may turn out that neither parent will be able to claim a deduction
for child care and household expenses, even if both are working
and even if their joint income is below that phase-out level. The
deduction can thus be lost by virtue of a divorce whenever the non-
custodial parent pays child support rather than alimony. Unfortunately
the payment of child support rather than alimony seems most likely
to occur in those situations in which the custodial parent is producing
an income, so that the natural financial arrangement will tend to pro-
duce seemingly unfair tax results. Taxpayers will have a strong in-
centive to characterize payments as alimony for tax purposes" even
59
 Married persons do receive special, adverse treatment in that they are not al-
lowed to claim the deduction unless they file a joint return; moreover, the income level
at which the deduction is phased out is the same for a married couple as it is for a
single person. See discussion in text at notes 75-78 infra.
60 A qualifying individual is:
(A) a dependent of the taxpayer who is under the age of 15 and with respect to
whom the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction under section 15(e), (B) a depen-
dent of the taxpayer who is physically or mentally incapable of caring for him-
self, or (C) the spouse of the taxpayer, if he is physically or mentally incapable
of caring for himself.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(b) (1).
01 As it affects the newly available deduction for household expenses, this requirement
is far more difficult to justify. See discussion in text following note 68 infra.
02 See Hjorth, A Tax Subsidy for Child Care: Sec. 210 of the Internal Revenue Act
of 1971, 50 Taxes 133, 141 (1972).
09
 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 152(a), a dependent is defined as a person "over
half of whose support" is supplied by the taxpayer.
04
 Under present law taxpayers have considerable freedom to characterize payments
as alimony even though they are in substance child support. See Commissioner v. Lester,
366 U.S. 299 (1961). A characterization as alimony will permit the "qualifying" in-
dividual to be regarded as the custodial parent's dependent and thus enable this parent
to claim the child care and household expense deduction.
928
DEDUCTIONS FOR FAMILY CARE EXPENSES
though, for other tax and nontax reasons, they might have preferred
not to do so. In addition, taxpayers with existing arrangements geared
to the pre-1971 tax picture may find that they have in effect sacrificed
a valuable deduction that would now be available.
Another change, of far greater significance, permits the deduc-
tion not only of the expense of caring for dependents but also of "ex-
penses for household services." a5 The statute does require, as did
earlier versions, that the expenses must be "incurred to enable the tax-
payer to be gainfully employed."' Taken literally, however, this re-
quirement would presumably eliminate the possibility of anyone ever
claiming the much-heralded deduction of household expenses because,
unlike child care, household services do not have to be performed at
any particular time. Since a working taxpayer can always clean the
house on weekends and cook meals after work or eat out, it is almost
never true that others must of necessity be hired to perform those
services in order to enable the taxpayer to work. Congress surely
did not intend that the Service and the courts inquire into the tax-
payer's mental process and try to determine whether an individual
taxpayer thought that buying household services was a means of in-
creasing leisure time, given the decision to work, or whether the
purchase of household services was somehow thought of as a condition
precedent to taking a job." Since Congress must have intended to
allow some deductions for the expense of household services, we must
read the "in order to enable" language out of the statute as it applies
to those expenses and we must then infer that the deduction can be
claimed without regard to motive whenever a taxpayer (or, in the case
of married couples, each taxpayer) is in fact working."
The allowance of the deduction for the cost of household care
is, like the deduction for dependent care, conditioned on the presence
in the household of a "qualifying dependent." A strange, and it is
hoped unintended, effect of this requirement can be illustrated by the
example of a couple losing a deduction of as much as $4,800, for the
cost of hiring someone to clean their house and cook their dinners,
on the occasion of, and because of, their only child's fifteenth birthday.
Of course, the basic idea of allowing a deduction for household ex-
penses is at best questionable" but surely there is no adequate reason
as Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(b) (2) (A).
66 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, g 214(b) (2).
6.1 Cf. Hjorth, supra note 62.
68 See discussion of a similar problem under the pre-1971 law in note 20 supra.
The "enable" requirement might also cause some trouble where the taxpayer maintains
a parent in a nursing home.
ao See discussion in text following notes 97 and 119 infra.
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for allowing this kind of deduction only to workers whose households
contain a qualifying individual rather than to all workers.
The 1971 Act also raised dramatically the amount that can be
deducted, from a maximum of $900 per year to a maximum of $400
per month." There is an exception, however, under which the maxi-
mum deduction is reduced where dependents are cared for outside
the home.71
 Since ordinarily one would expect that the cost of care
outside the home would be greater than care inside the home, this
limitation seems somewhat anomalous. Possibly the reason for the
reduced maximum for care outside the home is that such care would
not include household services, and separation of the cost of household
and dependent care services within the home was not considered
feasible."
Another dramatic change in the 1971 Act was the increase in
the income level at which the deduction is phased out from $6,000 to
$18,000." Above $18,000 the deduction is phased out at the rate of
one dollar of deduction for every two dollars of additional income, 74
70 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, * 214(c)(1). Putting the expenditure limitation on a
monthly rather than a yearly basis seems sensible enough in terms of fairness, but it is
quite a remarkable departure' from the far more convenient yearly accounting period
that predominates in the Code. In another provision, combining yearly and monthly con-
cepts, the phase-out of the deduction is based on monthly income if and only if yearly
income rises above $18,000. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(d). No one familiar with
the timing problems under annual accounting methods could take lightly the potential
problems of a monthly accounting period. Apart from theoretical and doctrinal issues,
there is the practical problem that many employers may not pay or report income to
their employees on a calendar month basis. Can there be a "fiscal" month? And what
if an employee arranges to lump into one or two months all income above the monthly
phase-out level of $1,500? Such questions are merely suggestive of the problems of
monthly accounting.
71
 The maximum is $200 per month for one dependent, $300 for two dependents,
and $400 for three or more dependents, for such care. ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(c)
(2)(B). Note that this limitation applies not just to the cost of sending children to
day-care centers but to the cost of maintaining a parent in a nursing home.
72
 Another possible explanation might have been a fear that care outside the home
would include educational, rather than purely custodial, services (though even within the
home a person receiving $400 per month for taking care of one child would be likely
to provide some sort of educational services). Senate Comm. on Finance, Revenue Act
of 1971, S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1971), specifically states that "expenses
outside of the home cannot . . . include educational expenses incurred for a child in the
first or higher grade level since these expenses are not necessary for the taxpayer to be
gainfully employed." Is it proper to draw the negative inference that the cost of education
(as opposed to mere custody) in the kindergarten and pre-kindergarten years is properly
deductible?
78
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, II 214(d). The original hill was amended in conference so
as to make the phase-out applicable to all taxpayers, whereas the earlier phase-out had
been applicable only to certain married persons. 1964 Code § 214(b)(2). Thus some
people who were allowed a deduction under the old Iaw will lose it under the new law.
74
 The provision works rather oddly in that the deduction is phased out entirely
at an annual income level of $22,800 (evenly spread over the twelve months) for a
person with expenses of $200 per month, but is phased out entirely only at an annual
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rather than the former dollar for dollar phase-out mechanism. Thus
the deduction can provide benefits for individuals or couples with in-
comes as high as $27,600, making it a benefit for the middle class.
While the phase-out applies equally to single people and to
married couples, married couples are placed at some disadvantage
since they cannot claim the deduction unless both are working" and
they file a joint return." To illustrate the adverse effects of this set
of rules, imagine a working woman with a young child and with a
taxable income of $18,000 before applying the section 214 deduction.
To make it an admittedly extreme, but not impossible, example, sup-
pose she pays $400 per month for child care. The tax saving resulting
from the deduction of the $4,800 per year outlay will be about $1,400. 77
Now suppose that she marries a man in identical circumstances.
Neither will be able to claim any deduction after their marriage be-
cause their combined income is such that the phase-out would have
eliminated the deduction and, by virtue of the operation of section
214, their taxes will increase by about $2,800 simply because of their
marriage!" This totally unjustifiable result could have been avoided
by allowing married couples to file separate returns and still claim
the deduction (i.e., by allowing a married couple making $36,000 to
file separately and claim the benefits of the deduction) and by then
gearing the deduction to single-earner situations." It would not have
been necessary to abandon the requirement that both spouses work.
Several other aspects of the 1971 Act deserve brief mention. For
example, Congress raised from twelve to fourteen the maximum age of
income of $27,600 for a person with expenses of $400 per month. See Hjortb, supra
note 62, at 135.
75 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(e) (2). There is an exception to this requirement
where one spouse is "physically or mentally incapable of caring for himself." Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, §§ 214(b) (1)(C), (e) (2).
70 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(e) (1).
77 Using the head of household rates under Mt. Rev, Code of 1954, § I (b).
78 To make matters worse, they would suffer an additional loss by virtue of the
fact that the rate structures produce a tax of $10,340 for a married couple with a com-
bined income of $36,000, regardless of whether they file jointly or separately (Mt. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 1(a), (d)), while the tax on two beads of household with incomes of
$18,000 each would be $4,160 each or a total of $8,320. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1(b).
It is true, of course, that in most cases of the sort I refer to in the text there will
be a reduction in the combined cost of child care after marriage, so the effects will not
be as disastrous as my partial analysis would suggest. But the full effect would be felt
where, for example, both parents had been maintaining disabled children in institutions,
or sending young children to day-care centers, and therefore could achieve no economy
by virtue of their marriage, though admittedly the cost of institutional care might be
deductible as a medical expense under Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213.
75 Possibly the reason for failing to adopt such an approach is that it might have
required that allocations of income under state law in community property states be
ignored for tax purposes (or at least for this tax purpose). Otherwise an unwarranted
advantage might arise by virtue of living in a community property state, since earned
income would be split between husband and wife even if one of them earned all of it.
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a dependent for whom the expense of care is deductible without regard
to disability. Also of interest is the retention of the rule, referred to
earlier,80
 that makes the deduction available to a married couple only
if both spouses are working. This rule is not limited to situations in
which one might reasonably expect the nonworking spouse to care
for the qualifying dependent—as, for example, where the nonworking
spouse is the dependent's parent. It applies equally where there is
no such natural obligation, as, for example, where a widower with a
disabled parent living with him marries a woman who has been living
on a modest pension. The denial of a deduction for payments for
dependent care or household services made to certain relatives, in-
cluding grandparents, nieces and nephews, aunts and uncles, and in-
laws was also carried over from earlier law. This retained element of
seemingly excessive stringency seems oddly inconsistent with overall
generosity reflected in the new law."
II. IMPACT OF THE PRESENT LAW
Economic Effects
I turn now to the major purpose of this article—an effort to
appraise the present law and to comment on some of its objectives,
beginning with some thoughts about its economic effects.
Analysis of the economic effects of the deduction of expenses for
dependent care—as opposed to expenses for household service—can
become a surprisingly complex undertaking. As suggested earlier, 82
child care expenses are not strictly comparable to business expenses
such as wages, costs of goods sold, and so forth, because the former
are incurred only by a certain class of earners—those with children—
and that class is defined by a nonbusiness phenomenon. Such a charac-
terization, however, does not require disallowance of the deduction
for dependent care expenses in the interests of economic neutrality."
88 See note 59 and text at note 76 supra.
81
 Although such stringency may be necessary in view of the possibility of abuse
of the deduction, it seems much stricter than is necessary. For example, the deduction
is unavailable even where the relative is not a member of the taxpayer's household. It
seems fair to assume that the relative will in fact be paid, and that he may be the
cheapest source of child care. Thus the risk of nonpayment or overpayment of relatives
does not seem to be sufficient grounds for denying the deduction in this situation.
82 See text following notes 7 and 10 supra.
83
 "The theoretical underpinning for economic neutrality as a criterion of tax policy
is the idea that ordinarily any distortion of the allocation of resources that would be
generated by uncontrolled market decisions represents a deviation from the economic
optimum." Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need
For Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 871, 879 (1969).
A tax rule is neutral unless "decisions affecting the use or allocation of resources are
different when the tax rule is in effect than they would be in the absence of tax con-
siderations." Id.
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In other words, the admitted distinction between dependent-care and
other business-related expenses does not necessarily require that any
deduction for the latter be characterized as a "subsidy" to child-
bearing" any more than a deduction of wages by a manufacturer is •a
"subsidy" to manufacturing." To reach general conclusions regarding
the proper characterization or treatment of the dependent care deduc-
tion, in relation to the goal of economic neutrality, would require an
economic analysis far more detailed and sophisticated than seems
justified for the purposes of this article.'" I offer the suggestion, how-
ever, that anyone who attempts such an analysis will quickly discover
that the issues cannot be resolved easily or in simple terms, but that
if one makes certain assumptions" it is plainly the case that the
dependent care deduction is not a "subsidy.' 88 Even if it were feasible
to engage here in a complete inquiry into what would be an economically
neutral tax rule for the dependent care expenses there is reason to
84 The "subsidy" label plainly implies that the deduction offends the criterion of
economic neutrality. That label was attached to the deduction unequivocally by Hjorth,
supra note 62. One of Hjorth's arguments was that dependent care expenses are no more
entitled to be treated as costs of producing income than are commuting expenses. Id. at
139. It was Hjorth's Implicit assumption in this line of argument that in no circumstances
could it be argued that commuting expenses are equivalent to business expenses. I have
argued essentially to the contrary, though I tried to avoid basing my conclusions on
considerations such as the appropriateness of a particular label or on causative analysis.
Klein, supra note 83.
88 No one would bother to observe that a deduction for wages means more to a
high-bracket manufacturer than to a low-bracket manufacturer, but the same kind of
observation about the dependent care deduction has been made (indeed, belabored) by
some sophisticated tax experts. 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal
Income Taxation 641-44 (1972). Their observation (from which I infer that they view
the deduction as a subsidy) was preceded by the more cautious, and correct (though
totally unenlightening), statement: "To the extent that Section 214 . . . permits deduc-
tions for child care ... expenditures in excess of those that would be properly allowable
as costs incurred for the production of income, the deduction constitutes a tax expenditure."
Id. at 641. The phrase "tax expenditure" seems to be functionally equivalent in this
context to the word "subsidy."
80 The kind of analysis I refer to would require examination of the kinds of
decisions that would be made—in all types of individual circumstances, with and without
a tax system and with and without a deduction—as to whether or not to work, and for
how many hours, and whether or not to have children. The variety of types of in-
dividual circumstances (including, for example, different states of mind about work and
child bearing, and different family circumstances) is large, and the analysis is com-
plicated by the fact that our interest is in a deduction, but the deduction can be examined
only in the context of a tax system and that tax system itself has significant effects on
the work decision and, possibly, on the childbearing decision.
si One such assumption would be that the decision whether or not to work arises
after a decision to have children has already been made and carried out (as where a
widow with young children seriously contemplates working only after the death of her
husband); another, that the child care services provide no personal gratification. See
discussion in text at note 91 infra. These situations are comparable to a situation in which
one is offered a job which, if taken, will result in unavoidable commuting expenses. See
Klein, supra note 83, at 895-96.
88 Id, at 879-83.
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doubt the value of such an effort, since other provisions of the tax
law" as well as other social and economic pressures°° are blatantly
non-neutral as they relate to the work and childbearing decisions.
One can, nonetheless, make certain limited but valuable observa-
tions about the effect of the deduction on decisions to work and decisions
to have children. We can begin by asking what effects a deduc-
tion for dependent care expenses will have on a person's decision to
work, given the fact that the family has a dependent requiring care
during working hours. Once we take such a dependent as given, and
once we assume that the dependent care services provide the taxpayer
with no significant personal benefit,° 1
 the financial reward from working,
the amount that provides the incentive to work, is the net figure arrived
at by subtracting the dependent care expenses from earnings (net of
other expenses). If the deduction were disallowed, a person would
be taxed on more than his or her net income, and for such persons the
financial reward of working would be reduced to a net figure below
that of other persons with similar net incomes but with no dependents
needing care. This observation by itself implies an economic distor-
tion. Moreover, if the deduction is allowed the financial reward for
working will be increased for those people who hire others to perform
dependent care services, but, disregarding the possibility of a personal
return from the purchase of such services,' the effect of allowing
the deduction will certainly not be to increase the financial reward
89 For example, the provisions that make it advantageous for married couples to
file joint returns (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1) have the effect of imposing on the
secondary worker (in our society, usually the childbearing wife) a marginal tax rate
determined with reference not to his or her own income but rather with reference to
that income plus the income of the primary worker. See Blumberg, Sexism in the Code:
A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 Buffalo
L. Rev. 49, 52-54 (1971).
99
 For example, job discrimination against women and family, community, or
religious pressure to have children.
91
 For purposes of the present analysis I will assume away the possibility of per-
sonal benefit. To the extent that the dependent care services provide personal gratifica-
tion, the offset for the cost of those services should be reduced by the value of that
personal benefit. At one extreme is the case in which a person would have paid for such
services even if he or she had not been working, in which case no deduction can be
justified. In less extreme situations, the services may still provide some personal return
that should reduce the amount allowed as a deduction. Cf. Klein, The Deductibility of
Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip—A Conceptual
Analysis, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1099, 1102-03 (1966). The phase-out of the deduction can be
justified on the ground that the personal benefit to the taxpayer is likely to rise as in-
come rises. However, even with the high phase-out in the present Iaw, the assumption
of no personal benefit worth worrying about does not seem highly unrealistic, particularly
since many people enjoy caring for children. Still, that assumption is weakened if we
also assume that a significant amount of household work will be provided by the
provider of dependent care: such provision must be classified as personally gratifying.
92
 See note 91 supra.
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of working above what it would be in the absence of any tax system."
On certain assumptions, then, the tax rule permitting the deduction is
economically neutral.
In the preceding paragraph I deliberately avoided any prediction
as to the effect on work effort of an increase in the financial rewards
of working stemming from the allowance of the dependent care deduc-
tion. The increased reward obviously makes work more attractive and
should tend to increase the amount of work undertaken, especially by
secondary workers, who generally are women. At the same time, how-
ever, the increase in the net income that will be earned from working
a given number of hours may make additional hours of work less
attractive than increased leisure." This effect would tend to decrease
the amount of work undertaken, at least in situations in which the
number of hours of work can fairly readily be varied. Accordingly,
it is not possible, a priori, to predict the net effect of the deduction on
the amount of work undertaken." It does seem safe to predict that
some unemployed people will be induced by the newly increased
level of after-tax economic reward to join the work force," but this
effect may be offset by a reduction of working hours by other people.
Let us turn now to the effect of the dependent-care deduction on
the decision to have children. I will avoid a discussion of the extent
to which people's childbearing decisions are affected by economic
considerations, but assert that as a matter of common observation,
the cost of having children does, for some significant number of people,
have a significant effect on the decision to have children. Thus, it
follows that a rule that makes children less costly will tend to increase
the birth rate. The dependent care deduction is such a rule. Compared
with a tax system that provides no such deduction, the dependent care
deduction plainly reduces the cost of having children for people who
work after having the children. Whether the deduction "encourages"
childbearing, or nondeduction would "discourage" childbearing, in
comparison with some neutral state of affairs, is not at issue here.
The point is that we can expect people to have more children if there
is a deduction than if there is not."
93 Note also that if the deduction increases the supply of labor above what the
supply would be without the deduction, it will tend by the same token to drive clown
the before-tax-effect wage rate.
N In other words, if one finds that he can earn a given amount by working fewer
hours, he may decide to keep his income constant and increase his leisure, or to take
a combination of higher income and greater leisure.
95 See R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance 233-38 (1959).
96 This effect might be offset by a reduction in the number of hours of work by
people previously in the work force.
97 it is not inconceivable, I suppose, that if in the long run the deduction induced
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Turning now from the expenses of dependent care to the expenses
of household services, a few succinct observations about economic
effects can be made. In the first place, since the deduction for house-
hold expenses is conditioned on having a qualifying dependent in
the household, the law will provide some financial incentive to child-
bearing and acquiring dependents by other means. In addition, it is
obvious that the after-tax-effect cost of household services will be
reduced," and presumably more will be purchased. Thus the cost of
buying increased amounts of leisure, by hiring others to perform
household chores, will decrease and more leisure will be purchased.
Creating Jobs?
One of the announced goals of the 1971 revision of section 214
was to create new jobs "in child care and domestic service."" The
idea behind this policy seems to have been that the deduction would
allow working middle-class housewives to provide others with jobs by
hiring baby sitters and maids or by patronizing day-care centers 100
That expectation, at least in this simple form, seems quite unrealistic.
As I have pointed out above,'" one cannot predict a priori that
the newly expanded deduction will in fact increase the total number
of hours of work expended outside the home by middle-class house-
wives. The deduction may give such women a higher hourly rate of
return for their services,'" but the effect may well be to induce them
to work fewer hours rather than more, since they can do so without
reducing their total earnings. Moreover, the congressional expectation
is based on a rather bizarre picture of the nature of the labor market.
The assumption seems to be that there is a large pool of potential
baby sitters and maids eager for jobs at the existing wage rate, yet
that somehow these eager job seekers do not increase the number of
job opportunities by competitively driving down the wage rate and
making their services available to more people.'" The far more rea-
women to get out of the home, their attitudes might change and the effect of that change
might be a decline in the birth rate. After that effect occurred, however, the effect
predicted in the text would continue to operate.
98 Presumably the before-tax-effect cost of such services will rise in response to the
tax-induced increase in demand.
99 Senate Comm. on Finance, Revenue Act of 1971, S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1971). The report further stated that the new law "can be expected to
give large numbers of individuals who are now receiving public assistance the opportunity
to perform socially desirable jobs which are vitally needed." Id. at 14.
100 Id. at 60.
101 See text at note 95 supra.
102 One must be cautious about this proposition, since an increase in the labor
supply will tend to drive down the wage rate.
108 This assumption is made about the one labor market in which it is least
plausible—a market that is one of the last bastions of unrestrained market forces.
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sonable assumption, of course, is that little if any involuntary unem-
ployment exists among potential baby sitters and maids, but that the
wage rate for such services is such that the potential suppliers of those
services have rationally decided to take other jobs or not to work
at all.'" Assuming that the deduction will in fact result in increased
decisions to go to work on the part of the middle-class housewives, the
effect simply will be to increase the total demand for child care and
household services. Ordinarily one would expect the effect to be some
combination of greater use of such services—more jobs held—and an
increase in the wage rate, but not an increase in the number of jobs
held without a rise in the wage level. To adapt the common parlance,
good (that is, inexpensive) domestics would be even harder to find
(that is, more costly to hire).
Curiously, if one accepts the congressional economic assumptions,
the probable effect on the job market seems even less propitious than
if one rejects them. The assumptions are that job opportunities in
household work are in short supply and that the job market defies the
commonly observed normal forces of supply and demand. But if it is
true that the woman who goes to work creates a new job in her home,
it should be equally true that she takes up an existing job, displacing
some other worker.'" Hence the net effect of the deduction may be
to shift unemployment from one sector of the labor market to an-
other.'"
Fairness
One's views on whether fairness requires that the income tax
system include a provision for deduction of the expenses of caring for
dependents can be significantly affected by the kind of comparison one
makes in examining the issue. In most economic analyses it seems to
be assumed that all adults are married and have children and that the
only relevant variable is whether or not the wife works. The children
are taken as given, but the wife's job is not.'" The comparison is then
drawn between two families with dependent children and with equal
104 It must be remembered that the women who might serve as baby sitters and
maids are likely to incur very large costs by accepting employment: transportation
expenses, costs of caring for their own children, and, often, the loss of welfare benefits.
105 See Hjorth, supra note 62, at 143.
100 There is, of course, the possibility that economic forces in one labor market
are entirely different from those in the other. But I cannot take that possibility very
seriously. That is, I cannot take seriously the idea that the level of employment of
middle class housewives is significantly affected by the wage rate but that the level of
employment of potential baby sitters and maids is not.
2°7 See, e.g., W. Vidtrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 32-33 (1947); M. White,
Proper Income Tax Treatment of Deductions for Personal Expense, 1 Tax Revision
Compendium, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 365, 371-72 (1959).
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total earnings; in one of the families the wife does not work while in
the other she does. Unfairness results from the fact that the nonworking
wife performs child care services for the family unit. That family is
therefore said to have imputed income from those services—income
that should be taxed in the interests of fairness but cannot be taxed
because of other considerations.'" On the other hand, the family with
the working wife must pay for child care services with after-tax dollars.
To reduce the unfairness resulting from the nontaxation of imputed
income to the first family, the deduction for child care expenses is
offered to the second family.'"
A similar conclusion can be reached more directly simply by
observing that the family with a working wife must of necessity incur
an expense that the other family does not incur and that the purchase
of the service, by hypothesis,'" does not provide the family purchasing
the service with any personal benefit."' However, stating the com-
parison in this manner should give us pause. In one sense it is true that
the expense is one that "must of necessity" be incurred, but in another
sense it is not. The correctness of the conclusion may be thought to
depend on one's time perspective. The expense is necessary at a given
point in time only because the couple had previously made a decision to
have children."'
To pursue this last point from a different perspective, consider a
comparison between two families, one consisting of husband and wife,
without children, and the other of husband, wife and child. Assume
also that in both families the wife is working. Obviously the childless
couple avoids an expense that the couple with a child must incur. But
what is the significance of that observation? One approach"' is to
conclude that the couple with the child has an added expense stemming
108 See J. Sneed, The Configurations of Gross Income 93-94 (1967).
100 See M. White, supra note 107, at 372; Pechman, Individual Income Tax Provi-
sions of the 1954 Code, 8 Nat'l Tax J. 114, 120 (1955).
110 See note 91 supra. There appears to be no disagreement over the proposition
that the expense should not be deductible to the extent that the service relieves the
family of an expense that it would have incurred regardless of the job, or to the extent
that it provides the family with a personal benefit. Obviously it will be difficult to draw
the distinctions suggested by this statement and arbitrary rules will be required. The
phase-out of the deduction as income rises above $18,000 is such a rule and seems to
me to be a sensible one, though perhaps a bit generous.
111 See Klein, supra note 83, at 889, arguing for the deductibility of outlays that
are nonvolitional and that do not improve the taxpayer's position.
112 I think it is reasonably clear that having children is not always an involuntary
decision and that some people may, for economic reasons, decide not to have children.
See text at notes 96-97 supra.
113 A different approach might be called for if it is assumed that economic con-
siderations have little or nothing to do with the child-bearing decision, either by couples
with children or by childless couples.
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in part from their decision to have children." 4 Another approach is to
take the perspective of the childless couple and conclude that one con-
sequence of their decision to remain childless is that they save money
on child care. It seems perfectly reasonable and just that their saving
should be available to them for other pleasures. From this perspective,
fairness does not seem to require a deduction for child care expenses."'
With this perspective in mind we can profitably return to the
original comparison of the two couples, both with children, only one
of which has a working wife. Assume that the couple with the working
wife made a deliberate, conscious decision to have a child, knowing
that one of the costs of that decision would be the expense of hiring
baby sitters while both the husband and wife were working. In this
situation it would appear that the child care expense is more properly
regarded as a cost of having children—a cost of personal consumption
—and not a cost of working. On this assumption, then, it would be
difficult to argue that fairness requires a deduction of the child care
expense for such a couple, except for the troublesome fact that their
counterpart family with the wife not working has the benefit of the
wife's untaxed services in kind.'" However, this result is part of a
much broader problem, which is that many taxpayers or taxpaying
couples with identical earnings have different amounts of free time
available either for leisure or for the performance of services for them-
selves; this is a general problem of tax policy, not limited to the area
of child care. It creates a dilemma for which there is no entirely satis-
factory solution."'
The preceding analysis should suggest that the question of fairness
is subject to the same complexities and uncertainties as is the question
of economic effects. Consequently I will venture only this tentative
generality: if we assume that childbearing will increasingly be seen
as a conscious, volitional phenomenon, and if we assume that people
114 There are obviously two prominent and necessary conditions to incurring the
expense: the child and the job. The mere fact of having the child presumably is a
personal benefit (unless the parents made a serious mistake) and it seems fair, therefore,
to treat the costs incidental to achieving that benefit as personal. Note that I refer here
to the benefit of having children, not to the benefit or the necessity of hiring a baby
sitter once the child is born.
The couple with the child spends a portion of their income on having children
and the childless couple spends a comparable amount on some other pleasure. The point
is that no deduction is required in order that they be treated equally under the tax
system.
110 Suppose that all women worked and that the only variable was whether they
bore children and retained responsibility for them. In such circumstances, I can think
of no sound basis for allowing a deduction for child care expenses unless there were some
good reason for wanting to increase the population.
117 Perhaps the best solution to this dilemma is an earned income credit. See
Blumberg, supra note 89, at 61-62.
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as time goes by will increase their leisure time in proportion to their
working time, the "fairness" argument for allowing the deduction for
child care expenses will weaken.118
The deduction for household expenses again requires only brief
comment. In the first place, whatever may be the justification for a
deduction for such expenses on grounds of fairness, there is no defense
whatever for conditioning the deduction on having a qualifying depen-
dent in the household.119
 Second, it may be true that the allowance of
the deduction improves the fairness of the system by offsetting the ad-
vantage a couple can achieve where one spouse stays home and performs
untaxed services for the family. At the same time, however, household
chores, unlike dependent care duties, can be accomplished after work-
ing hours and on the weekends. Thus the major effect of allowing the
deduction may be simply to allow,people to purchase more leisure time.
The potential invidious effects of this phenomenon are aptly described
by the economist Richard Goode:
Even if certain expenses could be identified as costs, a deduc-
tion for them would be unfair to families—usually those with
low and low-middle incomes—in which the household work is
done by the working wife or other family members in the
evenings or on weekends compared with families which hire
household help and enjoy more leisure. The practical effect
of an allowance for expenses for household help would be
discrimination in favor of upper-middle income groups. 120
Nondiscretionary Outlays
Canada's Carter Commission Report developed the notion that
the proper basis for taxation—the proper standard for fairness in the
distribution of a tax based on ability to pay—should be "discretionary
economic power" 121 rather than the somewhat broader Haig-Simons
concept of income that has been in vogue among tax theorists in this
country over at least the past generation.'" For present purposes it is
not necessary to examine the Carter Commission's general model or all
118 My analysis implicitly dismissed two theories of childbearing that might have
required more attention in an earlier time or in other countries. Both theories would deny
that children are produced for the personal gratification of the parents. One would
assert that children are produced as economic assets with future returns to the parents
and the other would claim that children are produced out of a sense of obligation to
God or society.
119 See text following note 68 supra.
120 R. Goode, The Individual Income Tax 81 (1964).
121 3 Report of the [Canadian] Royal Commission on Taxation 5 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Canadian Report],
122 See H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation 41-58 (1938).
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its ramifications.123 It is sufficient simply to extract the essential appeal
to fairness implicit in the phrase "discretionary economic power"—
namely the thought that the only amount that should be subject to
taxation is the amount that a taxpayer has left after subtracting cer-
tain payments over which he or she has no control.'" This principle
seems to me to serve as a simple and appealing basis for deduction of
the cost of caring for certain classes of dependents other than children.
The moral obligation to provide care for dependent parents, siblings
and other relations seems to me to make the cost of doing so involun-
tary in the usual sense of that term.'" Since the money so spent is not
available for paying taxes, the proper base for taxation is the amount
of income left after that cost has been subtracted.' 2° The care of chil-
dren, however, cannot properly be viewed in this manner. As suggested
above,' the cost of caring for children can be thought of as a voluntary
outlay—as a matter of consumption, if you will."' This observation
does not resolve the question of whether such expenses should, in some
circumstances, be deductible. That is a difficult, complex question—
although I am prepared to offer my own tentative view that the present
trend toward expansion of the deduction should be resisted.
123 For a discussion of discretionary economic power see Bittker, Income Tax Re-
form in Canada: The Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev.
637, 638-45 (1967).
124 Cf. C. Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Federal Income Tax 13 (1960), pre-
senting an argument for deduction of "unavoidable" expenses. One might want to add
the requirement that the outlay must be one that produces no personal gratification,
though arguably that requirement is redundant with the requirement of involuntariness.
To avoid ambiguity I prefer to express the idea as a dual requirement. See text following
note 111 supra.
123 See 3 Canadian Report, supra note 121, at 228.
120 Other outlays for which the deduction can be defended according to the same
theory are medical expenses, alimony child support payments, and, perhaps, certain
gifts to religious or charitable organizations.
127 See text at notes 97-98 supra.
128 But see 3 Canadian Report, supra note 121, at 34, 193, treating child care ex-
penses as nondiscretionary where both parents are working.
941
